All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

your very kind words. It’s always an honor to testify for a

committee of the U.S. Senate, and I am grateful for that.

The question before us really is, should the United States depose

Saddam Hussein? And my answer is clearly yes. We could do it,

and we must do it quickly and decisively and with a firm commitment

to a just and democratic future for Iraq and the Iraqi people.

I have heard several reasons articulated as to why we should not

remove Saddam Hussein from power. If you will let me engage in

a little of what we used to call in the law ‘‘anticipatory pleading,’’

I’m going to try to refute some of these arguments for inaction.

One is quite frequently made, and that is that there’s no proof

that Saddam Hussein continues to develop weapons of mass destruction.

I think this is plain wrong. I should begin by noting that

the Rumsfeld report submitted in July 1998 made clear that the

ability of American intelligence agencies to predict timeliness and

time lines for weapon development to rogue states is eroding, both

because of gaps in our human intelligence-gathering capabilities

and the whole nature of security these days in the security environment

in this world. In other words, Mr. Chairman, I think we

should not assume that we can be comfortable simply because

someone has told us we have 10 or 12 years before we have to worry.

On the question of whether Saddam Hussen is developing weapons

of mass destruction, just from open sources alone I can tell you

that he has been diverting trucks from the United Nations oil for

food program to use as small missile—mobile missile launchers. He

has acquired new surface-to-air batteries and is using them to target

allied flights over the no-flight zones in the north and south,

that he agreed to. And just last week it was reported that he was

attempting to import the stainless-steel tubing that is used uniquely

for gas centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

According to The Times of London, Iraq used the cover of a recent

disaster in Syria to ferry so-called flow-forming machines into

that country. These are used, again, in the centrifuge and its components

for uranium enrichment. And a mass of other reports indicates

that he’s reconstituting his chemical and biological weapons

programs and has been working steadily since 1998, which is when

the last of the U.N. inspectors was thrown out by him, to rebuild

chemical weapons plants.

And I would like to quote to you the words of Rolf Ekeus, who

was the first director of the United Nations weapons program inspection

teams. He said, ‘‘The systematic pursuit of the proscribed

weapons and the funds thrown into their development points singular

mind and extraordinary insistence. The present leader of

Iraq,’’ he said, ‘‘has demonstrated that he has ambitions for his

country reaching far outside the borders of Iraq. And these grand

designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of

mass destruction and the means for their delivery.’’

Well, then another reason for inaction, it is said that Saddam

Hussen has given us no real reason to depose him. Well, he’s in

violation of several United Nations Security Council resolutions. He

has been for almost 4 years. And there must come a point in cases

such as this when the international community recognizes a rogue

who will break every promise he’s made in his surrender at the end

of the gulf war and he refused to accept the standards of the civilized

world.

More importantly, perhaps, we must recognized that, if unchecked,

there’s every possibility that he will again use these weapons

of mass destruction on his own people, as he did in the Kurdish

north a few years ago, or against his neighbors, or provide them

to terrorist organizations with which he has ever-deepening ties.

And that brings me to the third point as to why we shouldn’t do

anything. It is said that unless he can be tied directly to the events

of September 11, the United States has no reason to depose him.

Or the idea that he must be tied to the attacks on the United

States is a strawman I think that’s constructed solely in order to

be torn down.

The United States doesn’t need to sacrifice and didn’t need to

sacrifice 3,000 of our innocent citizens in order to justify defending

our national security and that of our allies against a proven purveyor

of evil such as Saddam Hussein. And I hope that we have

not forgotten the brutal invasion of Kuwait and all the suffering

that caused and for which there has been very little recompense.

Saddam Hussein is developing significant links with terrorist

groups such as the popular front for the liberation of Palestine,

their general committee, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the

Abu Nidal. We know he’s cultivating operational ties with each of

these groups, and he’s doing much more than simply supplying

them with cash for the families of the so-called martyrs.

In addition, there have been persistent reports of a growing al-

Qaeda presence being inside Iraq. We know that Iraq permits

known al-Qaeda members to live and move freely about in Iraq.

And, again, I understand this is a lot more than just the limited

tales that we heard awhile back of small cells attacking Kurdish

up in the mountainous border regions near Iran. Al-Qaeda members

move freely around Baghdad, and they use their Saddamgranted

liberty to coordinate their operations worldwide. And Secretary

Rumsfeld, of course, has confirmed this as well as their presence

in Iran. While I think no one should assume that this situation

poses acceptable risks, we cannot risk the possibility that Saddam

Hussein will share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists.

I don’t know what measures of proof we’re going to require, nor

what degree of certainty that we would insist upon. Are we actually

to wait until we’re attacked by these most lethal weapons before

we agree to respond? If people are looking for an excuse for

inaction, they can say we must have positive proof that Iraq has

chemical and biological weapons or even nuclear weapons but that

only the real proof that we had—really accept under this terminology

is if we are attacked. It reminds me of some medical diagnoses.

You only get the proof that they were correct in the postmortem

examinations. I think it’s the presence, actually, and it’s

the essence of the Bush doctrine of preemption, that we should not

wait for that.

Finally, there is an assertion that I read regularly in the papers

that is attributed to all manner of reliable sources, and that is that

Saddam is contained now. Containment works. He will die of old

age eventually, so no action is needed. We used to say of the Ayatollah

Khomeini, that—not when he dies, but if he dies, and that

might well be applied here. This is the kind of vision I think—of

vision less foreign policy that’s called ‘‘let them attack first.’’

I must note that these rumors and leaks about war games and

war plans and the like are basically a disgrace to whoever’s perpetrating

them, and I certainly commend Don Rumsfeld for going

after them. It also strikes me as the height of irresponsibility for

the New York Times and others to publish these rumors. Anyone

who had been charged with the care and safety of the United

States troops, as I was for 7 years, would, I’m sure, feel the same

way. I’m glad that no one published the location of Omaha Beach

before our landings in World War II despite a mass of rumors as

to where we would land circulating at that time.

Well, then taking perhaps a little of that back, the suggestion

has also been made that all of these leaks are a deliberate

disinformation and deception campaign. If that is the case, then I

would say it’s very good of the New York Times and others to cooperate

so fully with this campaign of deception. But I would say,

in all seriousness, that, at best, disinformation campaigns are a

very risky business.

And then this assertion about Saddam being contained is basically

probably untrue. Containment is not working. He is exporting

upwards of $3 billion in illegal oil and using the profits for whatever

he wishes to. We don’t know. He has a reason to keep out the

arms inspectors that he promised to let in, and it’s not hard to

guess that reason.

In this day and age, containment means more than preempting

the expansionism of a weird dictator. It means containing the dan-

gers that they pose and hunting their access to weapons and instruments

and persons who assist them in carrying out their

threats.

Mr. Chairman, Saddam is not contained, and he cannot be contained.

He’s violated all of the promises which were accepted when

we crushed his military in the cold war. He cannot be believed, he

is an implacable and a permanent foe of the United States, and

that’s why I think he must be removed. We can have no peace in

that most volatile of regions until he is gone.

In conclusion, I’d like quickly just to address two other important

issues. The first is the role of the United Nations. It seems odd to

me, as it must to many around the world, that some in the United

States persist in supporting renewed negotiations for weapons inspections

inside Iraq. Kofi Annan has come to the end of his rope

after three failed rounds of negotiations with Baghdad. The President

of the United States has said that he will see Saddam Hussein

removed, and yet, notwithstanding, we continue this odd charade

in New York of seeking to secure more worthless promises

from Iraq that could grant inspectors the right to come in.

I note that President Chirac of France a couple of days ago said

that he will not support us unless the United Nations does. Well,

given the rules of unanimity in the United Nations, this makes it

the quite safe harbor in which to shelter France’s potential inaction.

The rules of weapons inspectors have also become looser and

looser over the years. There’s no point in sending in some team to

rubberstamp Saddam’s cooperation. Those who advocate that we

persist in seeking a solution to the problem of Iraq through the

United Nations, I believe, are basically simply advocates of inaction.

Finally, and, to my mind, most importantly, I’ve heard it said by

influential people that an a priori commitment of tens of thousands

of troops for many years is the required prerequisite for removing

Saddam Hussen from power. This seems to me to be an attempt

to set the bar so high that any operation in Iraq will be deemed

to be the President’s failure. We must remove Saddam, yes. Then

there needs to be a determination and a democratic transition committed

to a united and decent future for the Iraqi people.

There are many ways to accomplish this. Not all of them require

thousands of U.S. troops. As Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out, if the

Iraqi military could be persuaded to rise against the regime, we

would have very little to do.

The Iraqi people are perfectly capable of governing themselves if

they are allowed the chance. Representative leadership in Iraq

must have the full faith and credit of the United States and our

commitment to help them secure democracy. But we don’t need a

GI on every street corner for the foreseeable future. Nor is the predicted

chaos in Iraq, if Saddam is removed, a real argument. After

all, what was needed was a strong leader in Iraq, these people say,

and if that’s what we did need, we shouldn’t have bothered to fight

the gulf war. We had a strong leader in Iraq.

Now those who oppose a regime change in Iraq say that we must

keep that strong leader to avoid chaos. Well, regime changes in

most of the wars that we have fought did not produce chaos, and

it need not be so in Iraq. We changed several regimes after World

War II. And in each case, the result was a vast and a major improvement.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I think

this debate is a vital part of our democracy. I just hope that in discussing

how to remove Saddam Hussein, we will recognize and realize

that the boundary between the people’s right to know and the

enemy’s right to know is a very thin one and we would ignore it

at the peril of our troops.

Thank you very much, sir.

Senator, let me respond in a few ways to what

I think are very important comments you’ve made. In no small

measure, what I’m saying is that, as we look at how we deal with

a real threat, Saddam Hussein—Saddam Hussein, plus—with

weapons of mass destruction; I’ll come back to that—we have to do

it within the constellation of our overall security. We can’t simply

pull this out and look at this divorced from the consequences of acting

and the consequences of not acting, the risks of acting and the

costs—the opportunity costs that may have elsewhere.

So, yes, I do believe Saddam, plus—with weapons of mass destruction,

is a threat. We can’t deny that. To me, it’s the combination

of both. It is the capability and the intent, together.

To me, the greatest threat is Saddam with nuclear-weapons capability

believing that that capability is essentially deterrence

against us acting if he then seeks, once again, to take aggressive

action against his neighbor. I think that’s the single most dangerous

threat of this threat.

But I think the importance of this dialog that you’ve begun here

is to look at this in the context of American security. Can we do

this in a way that, in the end of the day, not only is Saddam gone,

but we’re more secure? We’re not isolated—less isolated. He’s out

of the picture. And I think that’s—you know, that is a risk calculation

which begins with these hearings and which I think is very

important for the administration to join with.

Well, that certainly is not my idea of what we

would do if we changed regimes, Senator. I think if we change regimes,

you will get rid of Saddam Hussein, of course. You also, if

it’s done properly, as we would hope to do it, would remove a substantial

amount of the threat of the development of nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons, because presumably the changed regime,

the new regime, would be a regime that would be installed

in power and would not have that as part of its agenda.

I think the very precision of Mr. Berger’s estimates of between

$50 and $150 billion indicates a lack of clarity as to precisely what

it is we’re going to be doing.

I don’t think we have to rebuild the nation of Iraq. I think we

have to set up a framework so that the people themselves can cover

themselves. And there is no doubt that there will be some assistance

needed, perhaps, for that regime. There’s not reason for us to

bear it alone. I would think that there—the ideal arrangement

would be to have a number of the moderate Arab countries and

anyone else who wishes to join become part of an army of occupation

that would stay while the regime was being changed.

We had considerable experience with this after World War II. We

changed regimes in every single country that we fought against,

very much to their improvement, and with the result that we

ended up with some very warm, close allies who formerly had been

bitter enemies. And I don’t see any reason why that can’t be done.

We didn’t have to rebuild those countries. We had the Marshall

Plan, which was correctly described as the most altruistic act in

history, and it helped a lot, but it helped us, too.

So I think that a lot of this is a sort of set of strawmen that are

set up as a basis for arguing for inaction. We all agree that the regime

is terrible, that Saddam Hussein is a beast of the worst kind

and most go, but then everybody starts pointing out the enormous

difficulties afterwards.

The departure of Saddam Hussein doesn’t guarantee chaos in the

region. And I would think that a victorious group of armies or

group of nations that participated in his being eliminated in a regime

change would also want to participate in whatever is necessary

to keep the situation basically stable and secure. And so I

don’t think that any of these boogeymen that we’re hearing about

are necessarily that is going to happen, certainly not some of these

wild estimates of how much it’s going to cost. That’s a good way

to frighten off the American people, but I don’t think it has very

much accuracy.

Well, Senator, I think if we go in alone and remove

Saddam Hussein, we’ll find that success has many allies. I

think one of the reasons that you’re hearing a lot of warnings and

complaints and criticism of the possibility are from countries who

fear that we would not stay the course. They live in the neighborhood.

They know what this man is like, and they don’t want to be

put out on a limb by a false start by us, so to speak, or a rapid

winding up.

If they are sure that we’re going to stay the course and finish the

job and eliminate Saddam Hussein, I think you’ll find a great many

people swarming around wanting to join the team. And I think that

would be a very good thing.

I think we need help. We need all the help we can get. It will

not be an easy task. But I think that the important thing is to do

it and to have it as our clear objective that it is going to be done.

I do wish that there would be less discussion of the how and

when and where of the actual operation, because I think that imperils

the troops, and that’s my primary concern.

I think that when it happens is not nearly as important as to the

fact that it winds up successfully. And if it’s a few months off or

if it’s a very short time off or if it’s a little longer than that, I don’t

think it’s nearly as important as our resolve to do it and our building

steadily the preparations necessary to do it.

After he’s gone, I would hope and believe that the nations in the

region, the neighbors who have been sort of terrorized by Saddam

Hussein, who fear him as well as hating him, would, after a brief

period of dancing in the streets, be very glad to join in any kind

of a regime or to assist a regime that would provide a Saddam-less

Iraq.

So I think the important thing is for us to decide what we have

to do, and that is regime changing, and to do it, and to do it well,

and to stay with the groups that are there and not feel we have

to lead it or be the only one there.

If we’re alone in the actual removal operation, so be it. But I

would be very certain that a successful operation by us alone would

produce a very substantial number of allies very, very quickly.

Well, Senator, it’s pure guesswork, of course,

as you know. Not only that, but I’m long out of office, and so I

would be guessing.

First of all, you ask if conditions are different. One thing is different,

and that is he has a lot fewer troops. He has a lot fewer

tanks and a lot fewer infantry and a lot fewer artillery pieces than

he had at that time. Sadly, we didn’t destroy the whole thing, but

he’s left with a fair amount, but it’s a very much smaller amount.

Roughly, I’d say 30 percent now of what he had at the start of the

gulf war. So that’s one significant difference.

I don’t think there’s any predicting what a person like Saddam

Hussein would do. I think we have to assume he’s not going to engage

in useless acts. I think he would undoubtedly perhaps feel

that if he’s being invaded and that there’s any kind of realistic

sense of what’s going to happen, he would know that he probably

couldn’t win. Whether or not he would use chemical or biological

weapons, I, frankly, don’t know.

I think we have to assume that he’s not going to be held back

by any of the normal restraints that a civilized person would be

under. He’s used a gas against his own people up in the Kurdish

north about 4 or 5 years ago—didn’t hesitate for a moment, because

he felt they were in revolt against him, and they can’t tolerate

any kind of revolt.

Whether or not he would try to do what he did in Kuwait is hard

to say. On his way out of Kuwait, he set fire to all the remaining

oil wells. I happened to be over there. I did go over there somewhere

within about 5, 6 days after that war ended, and it was a—

it just looked like every picture of purgatory you’ve ever seen painted,

and it was all completely useless as far as the military was concerned,

and he’s never made any effective compensation for it. So

we’re dealing with a person who’s not bound by any normal restraints,

and that’s why it’s hard to estimate what he would do.

He has far fewer resources, and I—it is at least possible that a

campaign against him would go well enough so that he would not

have very much time to engage in any nastiness. He’s got a lot of

very, very unpleasant weapons. The VX explosives and chemical

and various other things are very nasty pieces of equipment.

I don’t think I can help you by guessing, but I would guess that

if we are successful, he wouldn’t have time to do very much damage.

I doubt if he would use these weapons to widen the war, because

I think he knows he would find very little support for that.

I think the support that he thinks he’s amassing now is very chimerical

and is based upon simply a feeling that if his neighbors,

who uniformly hate him, speak loudly enough against our doing

any invasion, that we may be discouraged from doing it. But

whether he would try to widen the war or not, I don’t know. There

would be no particular gain to him for doing it, but that might not

necessarily stop him.

I think you’re dealing with a very unpredictable person who has

no civilized restraints, and that argues even more strongly for getting

rid of him as quickly as possible. Frankly, I wish we had done

it at the end of the gulf war.

Mr. Chairman, ordinarily, I don’t think the

Secretary of Defense would get into that field. I was always accused

of practicing foreign policy when I was Secretary of Defense, but we didn’t get to the——

Basic point of telling the—or suggesting to the President that——

How he would respond to things of that kind.

The military’s job would be—and I assume that’s what’s going on

now, but I don’t know—it would be to plan for an operation with

a number of different contingencies. And they would plan to do essentially

what would be quite normal, and that would be to assume

that all kinds of options would be chosen against us, and that to

make sure we had the material and the troops and the plans ready

to deal with that, as well as the intelligence.

But whether or not that would include a guess as to what Saddam

Hussein would do with whatever weapons he’s got, as far as

recommendations to the President is concerned, I would think that

would not be done. I think that what would be done would be that

any war plans that might be developed would certainly include the

ways to respond to whatever it was Saddam Hussein might decide

to do. That would be part of the normal planning. I don’t think it

would go beyond that. But in the course of doing that, if the President

wanted to know what would happen if they used certain

weapons of if they threatened to use certain weapons, I assume the

military would tell him the basis on which they were planning to

deal with a contingency like that, but I doubt if they would advocate

a course of action.

Well, I think it’s a function of, largely, Senator,

as to how long it lasts. The costs of the military are there.

The increased operational tempo that is required by a war is a very

substantial exponential increase. And so that it depends entirely on

how long it lasts.

Desert Storm lasted less than a hundred hours, and it was an

expensive operation, of course, because we had to move troops so

far and so many and—but, as you pointed out, a very substantial

portion of that cost was picked up by grateful allies and very helpful

allies.

So it obviously is to our interest in every way to try to assemble,

if not the same coalition, at least as many as we can. And I suggested

earlier, before the recess, that we would have less trouble

doing that once those nations are assured that we are there to stay

the course and that we intend to see it through.

I would suspect that, just on the basis of ordinary planning aided

by some guesswork, of course, that an operation of the kind we

may be talking about—and we don’t know the extent of it, of

course—I certainly don’t—would be considerably less cost. But

you’re dealing with a reduced military on his part. You’re dealing

with assets that we have, and you’re dealing really—basically, it’s

going to depend on just how it lasts, how long you have to keep

this enormously increased operational tempo.

Again, it’s a guess, Senator, but certainly some

time would be required of us to demonstrate our consistency and

our resolve.

I don’t know how long that would be, and I

don’t know how many people would be involved. It would depend

entirely on how well the military——

Senator.

I think a great deal depends on our intentions.

And I want to call your attention to a much smaller scale—not a

replica of this operation, but Grenada. We went into Grenada with

more troops than everybody thought we needed, and we had a very

successful operation and prevented the kidnaping and detention of

American students, and we got out, and we got out in something

under a month. And a couple of months after that, there was a free

election, and we have not been back.

Now, that is obviously a much smaller scale and it had different

kinds of aspects to it, but the intention was very important, because

the intention was to do just that——

To get in and get out.

And I think that given that kind of same sort of intention, we

could—depending on how success the military aspects are, we could

not have to remain as long as some people are talking about.

Now, that certainly is true, and I don’t know

how long that would take, but a lot would depend on how many

allies we had and how successful the military operation had been

and what kind of conditions were left. And if you start from—if you

have a complete military victory, then I would suggest that the rebuilding

phase and the length of time for us to stay would be lessened.

Senator.

I think that’s true, but I also think we should

be pointing out the benefits——

Of a Saddam-free world.And I

think that they have to be ground into the equation, and I think

that’s a very major factor.

Well, without certain knowledge, Senator—and

I would disclaim that at the beginning—I think it is common

knowledge that there are a great many of these groups in Iraq. I

don’t know if that’s especially limited to the north—but the climate

that is encouraged by Saddam Hussein is one that encourages

them to gather.

Many of the Arab countries, particularly the moderate Arab

countries, like Egypt, for example, are very worried about these

people, and they take every step they can to make sure that they

don’t have undue influence on either policy or presence in the country.

I think Iraq is quite the contrary. I think they welcome them, because

I think they do—as far as I know—they used to do a substantial

amount of training of these people and preparing to unleash

them on the world. So I would think that there is a substantial

infestation of radical Muslim groups and know that the country

is hospitable to them and that they can operating with more freedom

they can in countries that are opposed to them.

Mr. BERGER. Senator, I obviously don’t have access to the same—

the same degree of access to the intelligence as I had a little more

than a year ago. So ultimately this obviously was a question that

has to be posed to the intelligence community.

Iraq, historically, has supported terrorist organizations, primarily

PKK, directed toward Turkey, the MEK, directed toward Iran. I

know that there is some evidence of support of late for groups involved

in support of the Palestinians against Israel.

Historically there has not been a close relationship between Saddam

Hussein and his regime and Islamic Jihaddist fundamentalists.

They see Saddam—have seen Saddam as a secularist. He’s

killed more Islamic clerics than he’s killed Americans. They have,

of course, at this point, a common enemy, and that’s why this is

something we have to be very attentive to and certainly be very

vigilant about.

But historically there has not been close relationship the Saddam

Hussein regime and the al-Qaeda, bin Laden, Islamic Jihaddist

movement.

Yes; well, the initial reports were that there

were some small groups of al-Qaeda wandering around up in the

northern area, in the mountain area, working across the border

with Iran and so on. There is a lot more than that now. They have

been welcomed to the country, officially. Some of them are being

paid as martyrs by Saddam Hussein. And the information about al-

Qaeda in Baghdad that I’ve been told when I inquired is from senior

intelligence officials who did not wish to be otherwise identified

but, of course, would testified at a closed hearing. I am told it’s reliable

by people with whom I have great confidence. And I think

that it might well be a good idea to have a closed hearing on the

subject. I would not be able to contribute more than I already have,

but I am told that that is the case, that the al-Qaeda groups are

welcome and that they are being supported, their families are

being supported, on the theory that they—some of them are martyrs

from Palestine and Afghanistan and that they will continue to

be found useful by Saddam Hussein for the people with whom he

deals.

Well, I don’t know if he’d share them or not.

I think he would—he would not be above allowing them to help in

the delivery of them or in the construction of them or as part of

his general plan. I know there’s a theory around that he wouldn’t

share them because he wants to have them all to himself, but my

belief is that he would utilize anybody that he could find, and he

doesn’t have very many outside allies, and he has quite a few inside

enemies. But I think he’d share the use of them and allow

them to participate in his—whatever plans he has. I don’t think he

would hand them the weapons and turn away, no. But I don’t think

that that’s—I think that’s a technical distinction that isn’t very relevant.

I was not in office at that time, Senator, but

I agree with you, I have not heard that, and I think if you look at

the timeframe, it’s not at all credible, because the war was over in

such a short time, and there were a number of people who felt that

the televised pictures of the road into the southern part of Iraq had

been littered with all of the equipment and tanks and everything

that we destroyed and that this might look a little too bloodthirsty

and we would have a chance to get an acceptable peace.

I think the fatal error was in believing you could trust Saddam

Hussein. And you can’t, you couldn’t, and you never can in the future.

But I don’t think that it had any connection between the

chemical warfare capability, whatever it was at that time.

He was not above a lot of those things, but if

you look at what he did on the way out of Kuwait, all of that had

no military value whatever, but it was pure beastliness and resulted

in a very, very large amount of damage long after there had

been an agreement that the war would end.

I’m sorry, I didn’t get the first part.

Oh, yes.

No, I don’t think so, because I don’t think we

ever would be allowed any kind of intrusive inspection of the kind

that’s necessary, and that’s why I think it’s so silly to keep talking

about relying on the United Nations. We’ve been there 4 years ago.

We got all the fine resolutions that we wanted, but nobody pays

any attention to them.

And you have to bear in mind that a great deal of what they do

is underground, and we have splendid satellites and all kinds of

good equipment, but they can’t look underground. And in the absence

of being allowed to go wherever we want based upon whatever

intelligence reports or rumors or anything else we pick up, in

the absence of that, no inspection is going to be, in any sense, adequate,

and any inspection is subject to having the actual things

that he wants hidden, and 4 years have gone by. So I—without any

inspections—so I would imagine that anything that was at all useful

or interesting has long since been hidden or moved to what they

consider to be a secure location.

No, I think U.N. inspections is an idea that has been tried and

doesn’t work and we shouldn’t feel that it would give us any kind

of security whatever.

Well, I would have to disagree, Mr. Chairman.

You’re never going to get an absolutist position out of the United Nations.

Yes, I know, and——

We can be very insistent, and

they will do what they’ve always done. If Saddam knows that that’s

what we want, he’ll say yes, and then when we go in, he’ll say,

‘‘Oh, yes, but,’’ and you haven’t focused world opinion any more

than you have now. He’s had 4 years in which he has succeeded

in throwing out an absolute U.N. resolution. And asking for it

again is asking for more useless promises from him.

And that’s essentially what you’re doing, that

he may give a useless promise, and then all you’ve done is given

him more time to develop these weapons.

If I disagreed again, I’d simply be repeating

myself, so I won’t take your time for that.

Well, I think it’s always desirable to have congressional

support, and I think there certainly would be and should

be consultation. I think that we have to have in mind the Executive

capabilities, the Executive prerogatives under the Constitution.

And while I realize that doesn’t involve declaring war, it does have

the idea of giving the President very substantial freedom to do the

things that he considers necessary in foreign policy.

I think Madison perhaps said it best in the Federalist, ‘‘In foreign

policy, the President is all.’’ But I think there should be consultation.

I think there would be. I think it’s very desirable to have

a full discussion of it. I think these hearings are very useful. I congratulate

the chairman and you on holding them.

I think that—I said some time ago, in setting out some criteria

as to when we should our forces, that it is desirable to have as

much support, certainly including congressional support, as you

can, because I don’t think you could fight a war against an enemy

and against public opinion or congressional opinion, and I don’t

think you should try to do it in a democracy.

So, yes, I think there should be consultation. I think there would be.

Well, Senator, I would say that you certainly

should expend a great deal of time and effort in trying to rebuild

a major coalition. I think that this involves a considerable degree

of consultation ahead of time. I think that it’s important for those

nations to be with us, and I think those consultations can continue

what has actually been started, as I understand it—that is, the

persuasion that we are serious, that we do make—plan to make a

major commitment, and we plan to win. And I think that that

needs to be done and emphasized in whatever way it can be done

consistent with security of the operation, with all of our potential

allies, including the existing ones.

And obviously some of the moderate Arab nations should be

brought in, as they were last time. We had—I think we had 31 nations

in the gulf war coalition, and I think that it worked extremely

well, and I think we should certainly try to reconstitute as much

of that as we can.

Well, I think, as I said earlier, I think before

you were here, that success has many allies. And I think that if

it’s quite clear we’re going in with the resources that we have and

the resources necessary to win, that we’ll pick up quite a few.

And I think we have to realize the hatred that is felt for Saddam

Hussein in the region. And his neighbors know him. And what

they’re afraid of is being caught out on a limb in which we’ve started

down a road and turned back. They live there. They’re there all

the time. We’re not.

So I think that’s a real fear that they have, and I think that has

to be overcome, and I think it can be done best by consultation, by

discussions ahead and by major efforts made to reconstitute as

much of the coalition as we can.

I don’t have any idea how many we would get. Probably not 31

at the beginning. But as things went on, and if the military operation

showed signs of success, I would dare to venture that we’d

pick up quite a few.

Senator, I would like to thank you and thank

the committee and thank you, first of all for having the debate and

thank you for the very fair and decent manner in which it’s been

conducted and in which we all had, not only an opportunity, but

a very ample opportunity, to explain all of our views. So I congratulate

you. I’m glad you had the hearings, and I will look forward to

whatever comes out of it.